Abstract. Locally decodable codes (LDC) [1, 5] are error correcting codes that allow decoding (any) individual symbol of the message, by reading only few symbols of the codeword. Consider an application such as storage solutions for large data, where errors may occur in the disks (or some disks may just crush). In such an application, it is often desirable to recover only small portions of the data (have random access). Thus, in such applications, using LDC provides enormous efficiency gains over standard error correcting codes (ECCs), that need to read the entire encoded message to learn even a single bit of information. Typically, LDC's, as well as standard ECC's decode the encoded messaged if upto some bounded fraction of the symbols had been modified. This corresponds to decoding strings of bounded Hamming distance from a valid codeword. An often more realistic metric is the edit distance, measuring the shortest sequence of insertions and deletions (indel.) of symbols leading from one word to another. For example, (few) indel. modifications is a more realistic model for mutations occurring in a genome. Even more commonly, communication over the web may sustain deletions (lost packets) and insertions (noise).
Introduction
In this work, we define and study the feasibility of locally decodable codes (LDC) for edit distance. Standard LDC codes are defined over the Hamming distance, allowing to decode individual symbols of the message by reading few symbols of the codeword. This provides enormous efficiency gains over standard error correcting codes (ECCs) , that need to read the entire encoded message to learn even a single bit of information. Additionally, LDC's have a curious connection to cryptography, yielding protocols for PIR (private information retrieval) with related parameters, and vise versa [8] .
We put forward a strong positive result, by demonstrating a compiler from standard LDC's into LDC's for edit distance, with only small losses to the parameters. In particular, the tolerated fraction of errors (typically a constant), and the code's rate are only degraded by a constant. The query complexity grows by polylogarithmic factors in the size of the codeword. The compiler is black box, in the sense that the LDC decoder for the resulting code uses the decoder of the original LDC code in a black box way (only reading and answering its queries to the purported codeword). Our main technique is reducing the task to the problem of searching an element in a large sorted list L with a constant fraction δ of corrupted values. The search should succeed with overwhelming in |L| probability for all but, say, 50δ fraction of the queries into uncorrupted locations. The number of queries to the list should be polylogarithmic. We devise a comparison-based algorithm with O(log 2+o(1) |L|) queries for this task. This algorithm may be of independent interest, as for the more stringent setting where all uncorrupted entries should be recovered correctly, there exist polynomial lower bounds on the number of queries by comparison-based algorithms. E denote the decoders of the original LDC (for Hamming distance) and the decoder for the LDC for edit distance that we construct, respectively. D w E E receives an input i and needs to decode x i . Fur that purpose, it runs D · H (i) as is, reading only the sequence of locations D H asks to query w H at, and answering them. To asnwer a query j of w H , it simulates the answer w H [j] using queries to its own oracle w E , which "induces" a codeword w H . Finally, the output of D H is returned.
Theorem 1. (Main thm., informal). Consider an (δ(n), q(n), (n))-LDC L
On a high level, L E is a composition of L H with a standard code I for edit distance. That is, to encode a message m, it computes w 1 = L H [m], divides w 1 into blocks w 1 , . . . , w T , and outputs I(w 1 ) • . . . • I(w T ), where w i is "almost" w i . To answer a query on index i, the goal is to find the relevant block in w 2 , and decode it to extract the relevant symbol. Even in standard codes, one central difficulty is in finding the block in w 2 . For this purpose, the w j 's explicitly include their relative index: w i = (i, w i ) . This transformation is in fact exactly the one used in SZ codes, where L H is replaced by a regular code C. The novelty of our construction, is in demonstrating that this transformation in fact preserves the parameters of LDC codes ( [7] show that for a careful choice of block length, it preserves distance and rate of standard ECC upto a constant), by devising a suitable decoder procedure. As we explain below, just adding the indices is not sufficient for LDC codes. If the entire codeword can be read, we can just "read off" the indices of all blocks, and use the (decoded) (i, s) for i in the right range as the values at location i. If there are relatively few errors, this will produce a C codeword with few erasures (duplicate and missing entries) + changes (erroneous entries we do not know of), which can then be decoded. For LDC codes, the problem is in finding a block w i by reading only polylog(m) entries from the codeword (in particular, |I(w i )| = polylog (m) . Although the location of the relevant block can move upto a δ |W E | fraction of symbols, we should find it with high probability for "most" blocks.
Our main technical tool is a new algorithm for searching an element in a sorted list L where up to a constant δ fraction of the original entries may be arbitrarily modified (and possibly out of order), looking at only polylog|L| locations of the list. The algorithm performs a "clever" version of binary search, coping with errors to the degree we need. It guarantees locating at least a 1 − cδ fraction of the lists' entries. This technique may be of independent interest. The problem of searching sorted lists with corruptions or errors in query's answers has been considered before ( [6, 2] to mention a few). The main difference of our setting is that we get much lower query complexity at the cost of allowing incorrect answers for some cδ of the uncorrupted entries. Without this compromise, comparison-based algorithms (ours included) the query complexity is provably Ω(poly(n)) for constant error fractions [2] .
We also observe that our technique for transforming codes for Hamming distance into codes for edit distance applies to the setting of computational LDC's [4] , and of Locally testable codes (see [3] and references within).
Our Technique in more detail.
Our starting point is the construction by Shulman et al [7] , that converts (standard) error correcting codes for Hamming distance into ones for edit distance. Their construction is a composition of two codes as follows. The resulting code C 2 •C 1 is a code for edit distance. Their goal is to obtain codes with efficient (in n) encoding and decoding procedures, and constant distance and rate. Thus, they plug in C 1 with constant distance and rate parameters, and C 2 • C 1 inherits these properties (due to also constant rate and distance for I). The reason that SZ do not just use I as the code for edit distance is its inefficiency of encoding and decoding, so it can only be practically applied to short blocks.
Besides constant (edit) distance, another property of the code I that they need, is that for every pair of different codewords, the distance between a prefix w 1 of w, and a suffix u 1 of u (or vise versa) of large enough (fractional) length, say 0.1, have large distance. This ensures that in a corrtuped codeword w, subsequences "close enough" to different codewords do not intersect "by much". Thus, a corrupted w can be viewed as a sequence of codewords (of I) and possibly garbage between them, written one after the other (possibly upto small fractional overlaps). This way, every original w i that was corrupted by "not too much" will be recovered when scanning a small vicinity of w i (as is useful for LDC's), or when scanning the entire w from left to right (as is useful for standard decoding, like in SZ). In fact, we will use a slightly stronger "no overlapping" property that is implicit in [7] 's construction.
This construction suggests the following simple transformation from standard LDC's into LDC's for edit distance. Plug the (standard) LDC C 1 as the outer code (instead of a standard ECC) into the construction. The code L E = C 2 • C 1 is our LDC for edit distance! A decoder for L E acts as follows.
Simulate C 1 's decoder D 1 . For any query D 1 makes, decode the corresponding block (by going to its vicinity), and retrieve the relevant query by decoding I. At the end, output whatever D 1 outputs. If I has edit distance δ I , then a δ E fraction of errors will corrupt (beyond repair) a ≤ δ E /δ I fraction of the blocks, but the rest will be correctly recovered (if found!). If the original LDC tolerates a δ H fraction of errors, we may set δ E = δ H δ I . As D 1 sees at most a δ E fraction of corrupted symbols, the new decoder's decoding probability is the same as D 1 's.
The main problem is that it is unclear how to find the required blocks. Due to deletion and insertion errors occurring before it, every block can be as far as δm symbols from its expected index (in the original sequence w 1 , . . . , w T ). To cope with this, we develop a clever binary search technique allowing to find it, even in the presence of corruptions. More precisely, we reduce our problem to the following problem of searching a sorted list L of length T (only known to us upto a factor of 2) where upto some (constant) δ fraction of the entries may have been corrupted. Entries of the list are of the form (i, s i ), where the sorting is by the unique keys i (upto duplications introduced by corruptions). One wants to learn s associated with i in the list (or that i does not appear in it). Design an algorithm V (i) that makes polylog(T ) queries into the list that returns the correct value c with probability 1 − neg(T ) for at least a 1 − cδ fraction of the original (i, s) entries, where c is a constant independent of δ.
The constant "loss of correctness" factor c above will just translate into a further decrease in tolerated δ E , namely δ E ≤ delta H δ I /c, so we can afford it. Roughly speaking, in uncorrupted entries in L will correspond to the list of blocks (1, w 1 ), . . . , (T, w T ) that we not "deleted", but either modified or newly inserted. The former blocks will retain their original order, where a block's corresponding key is a blocks index i, and s = w i .
In Section 2.1 we present our algorithm for searching sorted lists with corruptions. In Section 2.2 we discuss how to adapt this abstraction to searching a symbol w i in a codeword w of C 2 • C 1 as above. There are several technical issues that need to be carefully treated here. In particular, the type of queries we chose for the the sorted list searching abstraction are easy to (approximately) implement given w.
Another point where our construction diverges from the original construction of SZ is in the efficiency of I. As mentioned above, the inner code I is constructed in a greedy manner, with exponential complexity in the message space. In our case,this size is upto log m symbols, so encoding and decoding of that code may have complexity m log p (bit operations), which is prohibitively high in the setting of LDC and ok for standard decoding of the entire message (although overall efficiency of decoding is a secondary goal in LDC, it is important in practice). Thus, we use a recursive version of the inner code (also mentioned in the paper), where every block (i • y i ) is encoded by a SZ code (based on, say, Reed Solomon as the outer code), so the greedy part is now applied to messages of length ≤ log(log m · log p) bits. This comes only at a constant decrease in tolerated errors and rate.
Remark 2. For some settings of parameters, one would just rather fall back to standard SZ codes for edit distance, that read the entire codeword to decode. As explained above, some kind of "binary" search seems inevitable. Thus, we expect to lose a factor of log m in the query complexity (even if we were willing to give up such a factor on rate). For some codes, such as the Hadamard code, log m = n, so there is no gain in query complexity. Nevertheless, the construction is non-trivial for most useful parameter settings of LDC.
Preliminaries.
In this paper F p denotes a finite alphabet of size p (typically, but not necessarily a finite field). We denote the Hamming distance of two strings x, y ∈ F l p by dist H (x, y). The edit distance between x, y ∈ F * p , dist E (x, y) is the minimal number of insertion or deletion operations to be performed on x to obtain y (or visa versa, as dist E is a metric). We often just write "dist(x, y)" when the type of distance is clear from the context.
For a metric dist ∈ {dist H , dist E }, we say C : F By default, we consider families of ECC's C :
(sometimes p depends on n as well), and discuss their asymptotic parameters.
Here D reads at most q(n) locations in w . We use the following family of codes for edit distance implicit in [7] . Proof sketch. Roughly, we consider the buffered code variant, and view the S 1 codeword from SZ along with the 1/2-buffer before and after it as a single codeword of I. That is, I encodes as in S 1 , and appends 1/2-buffers of 0's as in SZ from both sides (there this is done only when composing C 1 with I). Let δ be the error fraction tolerated by S 1 (for sufficiently large t), and m be its output length. Instead of taking large buffers (say, some constant fraction of an S 1 codeword) as in SZ, we set it it to just δm. Consider first S 1 constructed greedily, with 1's interleaved into the S 1 codeword every other symbol (in the binary case), then the "no overlapping" property is satisfied. Note that I has distance (δ I ) at least δ. The (1/2)-buffers have a 0 fraction of 1's, while any non-buffer part of a codeword it overlaps with has a 1/2 fraction of 1's (both are of length δm). Thus, making s 1 , s 2 of length at least 2δm, and at most (1 − δ) Finally, we do not simply let S 1 be the greedily constructed code from SZ. The reason is that encoding and decoding of such a code has exp(m), which is too inefficient for our purposes. Thus, we replace S 1 with a code for edit distance obtained ad in SZ for their buffered version. Namely, by composing some C 1 with constant rate and fractional distance and efficient encoding and decoding for Hamming distance (such as RS code with suitable parameters), with I with a suitable t (around log m).
where the 0 are buffers of length, say m 1 /8. It has some distance δ 1 and some constant rate (somewhat worse then that of the greedy code). This variant of S 1 has poly(m) encoding and decoding procedures. Finally, plugging it instead of S 1 in the above construction leads to a density of slightly below 1/2 in a δ 1 m-long stretch in the S 1 -part of the word, approaching 0.4 as m 1 grows, and still a 0 density for the buffer. Thus, we get c = 1.5 for large enough m 1 (and small enough δ 1 ).
We will need the following version of the Chernoff's bound. 
Searching sorted lists with corruptions
As explained in the introduction, proving Theorem 1 boils down to the developing a search algorithm on a sorted list with (small) constant fraction ≤ δ of corrupted entries, making a polylog number of queries to the list. The list is comprised from pairs of (i, s i ) where i is a unique key (before corruptions). The input to the algorithm is a key i, and it should return a corresponding s i . We require that for all lists L with a δ fraction of corrupted entries, the algorithm returns s i on query i with probability 1 − neg(|L|) on all but some 1 − cδ fraction of the (original) entries, for a constant c independent of δ. Clearly, c can not be less then 1. In particular, if only the s i 's are modified (keys are intact), there is no way to recover the original keys. There exist algorithms in the literature in a similar setting with stronger guarantees and worse parameters. For instance, [2] consider algorithms that guarantee to recover s i for all values for which (i, s i ) was not corrupted, and if there is no key i in the sequence, corrupted or correct, the algorithm should output "not found". They prove that for such a stringent requirement, any comparison-based algorithm, that accesses some Ω(log |L| + δ · |L|) locations errs on some input with probability at least 1/2. 
Our approach
The natural approach to the question is to use binary search.
A Warmup -random error locations. To gain intuition, assume that the error locations were picked at random -each entry is corrupted with probability δ ≤ δ 0 = 0.2. Jumping ahead, for our application to LDC for edit distance, this would happen if the insertions and deletions occurring are at random locations.
Assume that the success requirements of the algorithm need to only hold for "most" error patters (allowing high failure rates for all queries for a small fraction of error patterns). Then the following simple algorithm and analysis would work. Given a list of length m = |L|, proceed in levels, so that on every level we divide the interval at hand into three equal intervals (start with the entire list). For the middle interval, randomly and independently sample log (1, 2) . We stop at intervals of size log 2 m, and scan the entire interval; return s corresponding to the first (i, s) in the interval, or ⊥ otherwise.
Quite straightforward analysis, implies that the above algorithm succeeds to achieve its goal for all but a small fraction of error patterns. One type of error is that of finding the wrong (i, s) and terminating the search (even if the correct (i, s) is located in a different interval). All these errors may only occur for at most 2δm of the keys i originally present in L. Those which were "duplicated" elsewhere, and those that were modified into the new duplicates, possibly erasing their own information.
For all other entries (keys) on which the algorithm may err, entries of the form (i, s) only appear in the interval that originally contains an entry (i, s) for that key, and thus this type of error may not occur. In that case, only errors due to excluding an interval originally containing i at some point along the recursion may occur -we refer to these as type 2 errors. This type of errors is slightly trickier to bound -jumping ahead, it will occur with probability > neg(m) for none of these other keys for this algorithm, and account for most of the errors of the algorithm for general errors.
A crucial point is that the probability (over picking error patters uniformly at random) that the search reaches an interval with density larger then 0.25 = 1.2δ 0 fraction of errors for any searched key i is bounded by poly(m) · m −Θ(log m) ) = neg(m) (Chernoff + union bound). Here poly(m) is a bound on the number of reachable nodes (for any key i) derived from 3
71 . It is easy to see that if the latter happens, at every step of the recursion, the algorithm can make a type 2 error when moving to the next step of the recursion with probability at most m Θ(− log m) . This holds since if i is in the first interval, (same holds for the 3rd interval), and assuming the error density in interval 2 is indeed ≤ 0.25, then ≥ 0.75 fraction of elements in 2 are bigger then i. Thus, having s ≥ 0.4 (necessary for b, s ≥ 0.4) is highly unlikely -recalling (i, s) can not appear in interval 2 (we account for such keys i in type 1 errors), s has expectancy of at most most 1/3. By Chernoff bound, s ≥ 0.4 thus has negligible in m probability exp(−Θ(log 2 (m))). Otherwise, getting s > b would require getting s ≥ 0.5 for same expected value of 0.3 -again a exp(−Θ(log 2 (m))) probability. Taking union bound over the path for any given key i, the overall error probability is O(log m · m Θ(− log m) ) = neg(m). The main difficulty is that for arbitrary error patterns, low density of errors in all intervals in not guaranteed. Thus, a more sophisticated analysis (for a somewhat more sophisticated algorithm, but quite along the lines of the one above) is required. In particular, the number of intervals we use will depend on δ 0 . The parameters tolerated by the above algorithm in this random errors setting are c = 2, and δ ≤ 0.2. The parameters we achieve for general errors will be worse c = 50, and δ bounded correspondingly (δ ≤ 1/c to obtain any non-trivial correctness guarantee).
The final protocol. Let us first fully formalize our setting.
-The protocol is specified by an algorithm S L (i). It has oracle access to a sorted list L, where some constant δ fraction of elements have been corrupted (possibly not respecting the original order). Let m denote an approximation on |L| upto a factor of 2 (m is available to S, while the exact m = |S| is not). The input is a key i to search. . If the interval is of size y or smaller, the sequence of all points in the interval will be returned.
Otherwise, an error is returned. Query weight is y (regardless of the query's outcome). -Output: Given a key i, such that (i, s i ) was present in the original list (before corruptions occurred), the correct output for it is s i . -Goal: Maximize the worst case fraction of keys i originally present in the list (before corruptions) for which the reply is correct with probability 1 − neg(m). Total weight of queries should be polylog(m) -we are not trying to optimize the concrete complexity. Proof. Throughout the analysis, we fix an arbitrary L and set of corruptions S of size δ |S| ≤ δ 0 |S| (but not the searched key i). We start level count at 1. On level l of the algorithm, we refer to intervals I that can be reached on that level as level-l nodes (for instance, there is a single level-1 node). We refer to the ∆ i equal intervals partitioning the entire list as basic intervals (note that such intervals coincide with intervals considered in all level-l nodes: such nodes contain either ∆ or 2∆ basic intervals). The size of an interval drops by a factor of at least ∆/2 every time. Thus there are at most log ∆/2 (m) iterations. In every iteration we make at most 2∆ log 2 m = O(log 2 m) queries of type 1, and queries weighting O(log 2 m) of type 2 at every step. Overall, the algorithm makes queries of weight O(log 3 m). We now turn to the correctness analysis. On a very high level, the intuition is that if there were no errors, the segment in which i belongs (in the original list, before errors were introduced) is the one which will be chosen as the segment with which we proceed to the next recursion level (including one additional segment, unless i is "close to the middle" , throwing out both adjacent segments). However, segments with errors, or incorrect estimations of (s, b) may affect keys so that the "correct" segment is missed altogether, or too many segments are selected, and we decide to abort.
Construction 7 Initialize the searched interval to
Several types of errors may occur.
1. In the worst case, all corrupted entries are not correctly recovered.
2. In the worst case, all corrupted entries duplicate some uncorrupted entries, and the incorrect payload is recovered.
As in the random case, errors that may occur as a result of terminating with a wrong (i, s) may only occur for at most a 2δm fraction of the original entries (key) i (see above). For all other values of the key i, this failure mode is impossible, and we have s = 1 − b for all sampled elements in all intervals, but the one originally containing i. To obtain a bound on the fraction of other keys on which the algorithm may err with non-negligible probability, we may from now on assume that this is the case.
Let us refer to I j 's with more then 0.3 fraction of corrupted entries as bad, and good otherwise. (i, s) ).
Let us assume wlog. that only the outcomes not explicitly listed in Observation 9 as (possibly) occurring with probability neg(m) can in fact occur. In particular, if I j has a fraction ≥ 0.3 of corrupted entries, we assume all outcomes are possible. We refer to such executions as likely executions. This is wlog., as taking union bound over the individual outcomes occurring with negligible probability (poly(m) overall) results in an event with negligible probability. This is by taking union bound over the ≤ m 2.71 nodes accessible on any input key i. We are now ready to bound the set of keys that are incorrectly recovered in likely executions.
Items 1,2 together yield at most a 2δ fraction of elements with wrong replies (with non-negligible probability). It remains to analyze how many uncorrupted entries y with contents (i, s) are not found because of aborting in step 2.1, or excluding the correct interval on a level l of the recursion from the node I selected for the next level, in some likely execution on input i. In this case, we say that uncorrupted entry y is injured on level l (note that the contents (i, s) may not longer be unique in I k after corruptions, by injuring (i, s) we mean its original index y in the list is not properly detected). For brevity, in the sequel we refer to uncorrupted entries y by their key i, in particular we refer to injuring y with contents (i, s) as injuring i in I k .
A word of intuition. Before delving into technical details, to bound the number of injured entries, let us consider a very high-level overview. Fix some list L and set of corruptions. One key component of the analysis, is bounding the number of entries injured on a given level l by some c · b l , where c is some constant, and b l is the fraction of bad basic intervals on that level, which in turn is bounded by δ/0.3 (of course, it makes sense to consider injured entries i for inputs i). To make the bound well defined, we make sure it is independent of the algorithm's random choices. As the number of levels is Θ(log |L|)), naively summing over all levels results in Θ(log n · n) > n, which is not a meaningful bound. The second key observation is that we should count the number of injured entries that are injured on each level for the first time. To bound these, we refine the first bound, and prove that newly injured entries on level l are bounded by some cb l , where b l is a subset of bad intervals on its level. Here we crucially use the fact that some intervals do not affect an interval I k because they are not in I k 's node on that level, so I k does not "see" them.
Observation 10 (possbily) Overestimating the set of injured entries i (over all likely executions with various input keys i) on every given level only increases the bound on the number of injured entries overall (over all likely executions).
We often use this observation in subsequent analysis. For starters, we (pessimistically) assume that all entries that fall in bad basic intervals will not be recovered correctly. The following claim provides a simple necessary condition for i in a good level-l basic interval I k to be injured on level l.
Claim. Consider a good basic interval I k on some level l, and some likely execution on key i. An uncorrupted entry i ∈ I k in a basic level-l interval I k is injured on level l only if there exists an interval I j , k = j at distance at least 2 from I k , such that the number of votes against (I k , i) is at least as large as the number of votes against (I j , i), or if I k is adjacent to a bad interval I j .
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Proof. Assume the precondition (following "only if") of the claim does not hold. We show that i is then not injured on level l. Clearly, i can not be injured by I j at distance 2 or more from I k has less votes against (I j , i) then against (I k , i). It remains to check that both intervals I k−1 , I k do not receive the same number of votes (or less) for i as I k . As I k−1 , I k+1 are both good, by Observation 9, none votes against I k with overwhelming probability. The difference in votes between I k and I k−1 (I k+1 ) (as all intervals besides I k−1 , I k vote in the same way for both) is V ote(I k , I k−1 , i) − V ote(I k−1 , I k , i) (naturally, we let V ote(I k , I j , i) be 1 if I k votes against I j on i, and 0 otherwise). The algorithm could still terminate in step if the difference above is 0 for both I k−1 and I k . However, by Observation 9 I k votes against at least one of its adjacent intervals in i (in likely executions), so this also can not occur.
Let i be an uncorrupted entry. For I k , I j , i as in Claim 2.1 (I j is as in part 1 or 2 of the precondition), we say that I j potentially injures (i, I k ) on level l (and i is potentially injured on level l). For all uncorrupted entries i in bad I k 's, we also define (i, I k ) to be potentially injured (by "whom" is not specified in this case).
As i being potentially injured on level l is a necessary condition for being injured, by Observation 10, it is sufficient to bound the set of uncorrupted entries i potentially injured on some level. The following "monotonicity" condition allows us to eliminate the dependence of our bound on the set of keys that can be injured on a given level on the random choices of the algorithm (in likely executions).
Monotonicity. Denote by B l the set of bad basic intervals, and by G l the set of good basic intervals I k on level l. Also, let G l the set of uncorrupted entries in G l .
Claim. Consider the set of likely executions on keys i originally present in L.
The set of keys i ∈ G l that are injured on level l (for input i) would be a superset if we modified the algorithm's decisions so that: 1. For all keys in G l , their interval I k votes against none of the directions. 2. All intervals I j in B l vote (w = 0, r = 1) for all uncorrupted keys i ∈ G l .Note that assumption 1 is and assumption 2 may be impossible in likely executions on i. However, we make these assumptions only for the sake of analyzing the set of keys injured on level l, and do not assume algorithm's execution actually changes. Under this assumption (i, I k ), a good key i can be injured on level l if.
-I k is a bad interval, or -(i, I k ) is potentially injured by some interval I j . This happens iff. [I j , I k ) has at least as many bad intervals as good intervals.
Proof. Consider a likely execution e 1 on input i, and let e 2 denote an execution resulting from making modifications 1,2 as in the claim. Consider an uncorrupted entry i in a good level l interval I k . As I k is good, by Claim 2.1 (i, I k ) can be injured on level l, only if it is potentially injured by some I j . Thus, assume there exists an interval I j (for notational simplicity, assume j < k, this is wlog. See Section B for a proof. The definition of potential injury, does not take nodes into account (that is, it acts as if we allowed all basic intervals to "see" all other basic intervals on that level in step 2.2 of the algorithm). If we take nodes into account, the bound on |M l | induced by the union of a set N l of level-l nodes depends only on bad basic intervals in N l . More precisely, we have the following extension of the above lemma. Proof. As in Lemma 11, we bound the number of potentially injured intervals in N l as induced by the sufficient condition in Claim 2.1. Thus, every bad interval in N l remains bad in S, and every good interval is injured if it "sees" a bad I j such that [I j , I k ) has at least as many bad intervals as good ones. The bound now follows as in the proof of Lemma 11 (note that we still do not account for some of the boundaries induced by nodes, but rather view S as a single node).
Observation 12
For every level l, let us bound the number of basic intervals in M l containing entries that are injured on level l for the first time. Then, to obtain the overall bound on the number of injured keys, we just sum over all the bounds for first injured keys (counting "first injured" keys, prevents us from counting again keys that were already counted as injured at an earlier point along the path). Let B l denote the set of basic intervals not contained (as sets of entries) in intervals in B j for j < l. Denote by N l the set of level-l nodes not contained in any node potentially injured on a previous level (recall nodes injured on level l − 1 are level-l nodes, and level l is not injured by definition). The set N l does not miss newly injured entries, as all entries in nodes outside of N l have been already counted as (potentially) injured on a previous level.
It follows from Observation 12, that the set of basic intervals in N l injured on level l is of size at most 5|B l |. In more detail, in Observation 2 we have B l ⊆ B l ∩ N l . This is true since nodes in N l simply do not intersect bad basic intervals from previous levels (recall all bad basic intervals on a level are defined as potentially injured). Now, applying Lemma 11, we obtain that N l contains at most 15|B l | basic intervals in potentially injured level-l + 1 nodes. Let us denote the fraction of B l out of all level-l basic intervals by t l . Thus, by Lemma 11, at most j 15t j · m uncorrupted entries were potentially injured on level l. On the other hand, as the B l 's are all disjoint sets of elements, and since every bad basic interval has at least a 0.3 fraction of incorrect elements, we have j 0.3t j m ≤ δm. Combining the two inequalities, we conclude that at most 50δl uncorrupted entries are potentially injured overall. Combining with possible losses from 1,2, we obtain that at most 52δ · l elements result in an incorrect output of our algorithm. (= O(log m)) .
Transforming standard LDC into LDC for edit distance.
We claim that the code C 2 (C 1 ) is a (δ 1 , q · polylog(m), + neg(m))-LDC for edit distance, where δ 1 = c · δ 1 , for a some global constant c that depends only on parameters of I t . The decoder Q 2 for C 2 runs a straightforward simulation of Q 1 , where the crux of technical difficulty is providing answers to Q 1 's oracle queries, using its own oracle. In slightly more detail. That is, F indBlock w 2 (i) locates the i'th block of w 2 , decodes it via I as some(i • s), where s is (hopefully) the i'th block of w 1 . As mentioned before, the main difficulty is in searching for the block in w 2 . We do not know where it is located in w 2 (but only upto a distance of δ|w 2 | symbols, or so).
Construction 13 Q
The high level idea is to somehow interpret w 2 as a list of sorted elements with corruptions (the sorting is by the index i written in each block), and run the algorithm for sorted lists with corruptions on it. For this purpose, we should be able to make "backwards" translations of the list searching algorithm's queries into reading portions of w 2 . In particular, we show that for small enough δ 1 , blocks from w 2 (= w 2 before modifications) form 1 − O(δ 1 ) of the induced list's elements, and appear in their correct order. It turns out that a slightly generalized abstraction of a weighted sorted list with certain restrictions on list weights emerges. Fortunately we will be able to adapt our searching algorithm for unweighted lists to this more general setting. See Section A for precise details. We obtain our main theorem. The proof of this theorem follows by the construction outlined in this section. Namely, the decoder for C 2 (C 1 ) is outlined in Construction 13. F indBlock
, and implements its queries using oracle access to its own oracle w 2 , as described in Section A. The various efficiency properties of the resulting code follow from Lemma 5. The constant c is a product of two constants resulting from the F indBlock w 2 algorithm. The core of this algorithm is a an algorithm for searching on weighted sorted lists with corruption. This constant is comparable to the (1/) 52 loss we get in the algorithm for searching unweighted lists 8. The other factor stems from the need to correct errors in I, and to make sure that the word w 2 indeed induces a list with a small (O(δ)) fraction of corruptions. This part is comparable to the fraction of errors tolerated by I.
A Details for Section 2.2
What list is induced by a codeword w 2 , and how do we query it? First, let us better define what are the entries of the list L 2 induced by w 2 . In w 2 the picture is clear, w 2,i corresponds to the block I(i • w 1,i ). After corruptions (at the level of individual symbols), some care should be taken when determining what the list entries are, and where each entry starts and ends. Recall I has distance δm t , and let δ 2 = δ, for a (global) constant to be determined later.
1. We identify all subsequences of w 2 that are δ-close to a codeword of Idenote as valid sequences. In particular, every w 2,i that underwent δ 2 or less insertion/deletion operations (when viewed separately from all other changes in the list) induces at least one such sequence. Fix a valid subsequence v j = [l j , r j ] of w 2 . Then by the no overlapping property of I (Lemma 5), and the fact that 1.5 only the range [l j − (2 + )δm t , l j + (2 + )δm t )] may contain other valid subsequences, and they must decode to the same codeword as v j . Otherwise, the closest valid subsequence starts at least (1 − (2 − )δ)m t symbols to the right or to the left of l j .Also, by definition of edit distance, valid subsequences are of length (1 ± δ 2 )m t . We refer to such extended valid subsequences as "valid extensions". Thus, we can think of the list as a sequence of "valid extensions" of length (1 + O(δ))m t for a small hidden constant (≤ 3). For now on, we do not explicitly specify this constant, or constants derived from it, but rather use the notation O(δ). It will the case that the derived constant terms O(δ) occurring throughout the following discussion will not be "too large". Valid extensions may overlap by some O(δ)m t symbols that decode to the same (i • s) entry each. Every such extension is defined by picking some valid subsequence v j = [l j , r j ], finding all valid subsequences in the range
, and defining the bounds of the corresponding extension as the shortest interval that includes all these. Note that valid extensions are well defined (and independent of the choices of concrete v j ). 2. The rest of the list consists of data stretches which are δ-far from codewords (possibly long stretches, of length not necessarily close to multiples of m t ).
Reading an entry in such an "empty stretch" will be interpreted as (0, 0).
Intuitively, the list induced by w 2 is a weighted list, the length of which is the sum of weights of its individual elements. The weights are specified in multiples of m t , and equal the length of an entry's "representation" in the list. The weights of entries corresponding to valid extensions are close to 1. The "empty stretches" correspond to sequences of entries of length 1 and one of some fractional weight at the end of a sequence. The valid extensions consist of "mildly corrupted" w 2,i 's, appearing in their original order (as in w 2 ), and new "fake" entries that are valid extensions created by indel operations corresponding to arbitrary values (possibly breaking the order), of weight close to 1 each.
To make the intuition of the induced list precise, we should specify how we implement reading a random entry from the induced list, which is the main type of query used by the sampling algorithm. We prove that indeed the output behaves (almost) exactly as if we read a random weighted entry from a list as described above.
The main type of query in the list searching algorithm is picking a list entry at random from a certain "long" interval -currently think of the interval as being the entire list).
Sampling a random entry in the list induced by w 2 . We are given an oracle to a (corrupted) codeword w 2 , of length h. To sample a random element of the induced weighted list L 2 , pick a random l ∈ [h], and read an interval D of 2m t symbols starting at l. Search for a subsequence in D that is δ 2 -close to a codeword of I. This can be accomplished by decoding and checking distance between the (re-encoded) result and the tested subseqeunce (note that decoding can be successful for much worse distances, and I in fact tolerates edit distance of upto δ).
If stretches' weight thus changes by some ±O(δm t ), and they are represented by stretches e j between the different d j 's. Some sufficiently short stretches' weight may go down to 0, in which case we do not count them as elements of L 2 at all. We interpret every such stretch as a sequence of weight-1 (0, 0) entries, where the last one has some fractional weight (completing the weight to |e j |).
To summarize, the induced weighted sorted list L 2 is as follows. We have oracle access to a sorted list with entries (i, s) labeled d j or e j,t of various lengths, specified in multiples of m t (most are close to 1, and some can be smaller fractions), according to the length of the corresponding interval d j or e j,t in w 2 . Sampling an entry at random samples every entry with probability proportional to its weight.
We make the following simple observations about the list's size and weights. In all the above arguments, we relied on , δ being small. To make everything go through, can be set to about 0.1.
Let us now connect the bound δ 1 on dist(w 2 , w 2 ) and properties of the resulting list. Assume w 2 sustained δ 1 |w 2 | indel operations. Then we have: From the above calculations, we conclude that taking δ to be sufficiently small, and δ 1 ≤ δ 2 , the relative weight of uncorrupted entries in L 2 will be large enough so that the weight of uncorrupted entries is 1 − O(δ 1 / δ) .
The list searching algorithm actually needs to make random samples in specified intervals. To specify a fractional interval [α, β] in the list, we will simply use the interval [α|w 2 |, β|w 2 |] in w 2 . The above procedure trivially modifies to randomly sampling an interval corresponding to some w 2 [s, e] by just picking a random l in that interval, and doing everything else as before. There are certain artifacts of possibly losing/reducing weight of some O(1) entries at the beginning of an interval or the entire list. Jumping ahead, this can be neglected, since over all intervals reachable by the list searching algorithm, only O(T / log 2 T ) elements fall into these areas, while we consider the range of constant error fractions.
A second type of query we need to handle is checking whether an interval [s, e] in w 2 has at most y elements in it. Returning all elements if it does, To implement this query, check if the interval is of length (2 + O(δ))(y + 1)m t or smaller (for a suitable constant). If so, recover the d j , e j,l 's in D, and check whether their number is y + 1 or higher. If so, return the recovered elements, otherwise return ⊥. The query requires at most 3(y + 1)m t queries to the LDC oracle w 2 .
Adapting searching in corrupted sorted lists to the weighted setting. We are ready to fully specify the abstraction of searching on weighted sorted lists with corruptions needed by the F indBlock w 2 procedure in our LDC query algorithm. We adapt the protocol for unweighted lists from Section 2.1 to the case at hand of weighted lists. The algorithm will put some preconditions on the weights in the list, that are satisfied by observations made about the induced list L 2 in the previous section. Let us define the setting more precisely. 
A random element is returned, by a probability distribution assigning each entry a probability measure proportional to its weight. Query weight is 1. Analysis sketch. The analysis is a quite straightforward adaptation of the analysis of the algorithm for the unweighted case in Section 2.1, with the following minor changes.
-In the complexity analysis, we need to make sure that the number of elements in the list still drops by some constant factor per recursive step (and thus, there are O(log m) levels, where the leafs have intervals of length log 2 m = O(log 2 m)), as before. This follows since the total weight of elements in an interval decreases by a factor of at least 2/∆ in every recursive step, and the number of elements in an interval is at most 2 times its weight. As this holds for the entire list as well, we start with W ≤ 2m, and the claim follows. -Everywhere we consider fractions, we instead consider weighted fractions.
Essentially, we adapt the definitions of (b, s) to be weighted, and the definitions of bad and good intervals are the same relatively to the values of (b, s), and the analysis easily goes through. The analysis of votes etc. remain the same (just count votes). However, we are counting bad and "potentially injured" intervals, without accounting for weights. Thus, the final analysis, bounding "newly" injured entries, where basic intervals have equal weights also remains the same. One notable place where this requires some care is when applying Chernoff bounds to estimating (b, s) in at an interval's I j 's votes against its left or right side. For this purpose, we need to use the weighted variant of the Chernoff bound. -Finally, as mentioned before, we are neglecting "edge effects" when reading entries of (long) intervals, where the first O(1) elements in every interval are not accessible, or have reduced weights. These can be neglected as all of our intervals are of length at least log 2 m, so these effects have overall sub-constant effect on the algorithm. The effects start being non-negligible for δ 1 = o(log 2 m), but not for the range of constant δ that we are interested in. This is as opposed to the unweighted case, where the 
B Proof of Lemma 1, Section 2.1
Recall from Claim 2, that a sufficient condition on interval I k being in M l is as follows.
1. I k is a bad interval, or 2. There exists a bad interval I j (assume wlog. j < k) , so that [I j , I k ) has at least as many bad intervals b as good intervals g.
Thus, it suffices bound the set of basic level-l intervals satisfying the above condition. We prove the lemma by induction on the number t of bad intervals on that level (for any number of basic intervals n l on that level). Base case, t = 1. Here only the bad interval itself and two adjacent intervals on both sides are potentially injured.
Step. Assume the lemma holds for all n l and t ≤ t. To prove for t + 1, consider the list L with t bad intervals I 1 , . . . , I t (ordered from left to right) from which our list L is obtained by transforming one interval, I 0 in L from good into bad. Assume for simplicity that it is located to the left of I 1 (this is wlog.). Our goal is to identify the set of intervals that were injured due to adding the new bad interval (and were not injured in L ). As making I 0 bad is the only change, the only ("meta"-)interval that can explain the injury of some good (basic, level-l) interval I k is [I 0 , I) (or (I, I 0 ], if I is located to the left of I 0 ). As to newly injured intervals to the right of I j , there can be two options.
1. Assume I 0 is at distance at least 2 from I 1 . Then it can not newly injure any intervals I located to the right of I 1 in L . This is the case since by I not being injured in L , it means that for all I j 's located to the left of I [I j , I ) satisfy b < g (similarly all (I , I j ) for I j to the right of I , but these remained unchanged). The only new potential "injurer" for I is [I 0 , I ). However, there the balance of b, g is the same or worse as in [I 1 , I ) (b grows by 1, and g grows by at most 1), so no new "injury" is inflicted on I . As to intervals I in (I 0 , I 1 ), at most two intervals to the right of I 0 can become newly injured, by similar considerations of balance between b, g in (I 0 , I ).
2. Assume I 0 is right to the left of I 1 . Then it improves over the balance of b, g in [I 1 , I ) for all I to the right of I 1 exactly by 1 (and it is the only change for all these I 's). Let I be the leftmost newly injured such good interval (if any). Then it must be the case that b − g in [I 1 , I ) is −1 (and thus 0 in [I 0 , I )). We show that no additional I's to the right of I can be newly injured. Clearly, for I's to the left of I 0 , at most the two adjacent ones can be newly injured. Thus, turning I 0 into a bad interval, added at most 5 injured intervals (including I 0 ). Overall, we conclude that at most 5t intervals in L are potentially injured if t of the intervals are bad.
